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n the wake of the global financial meltdown and the great recession, more people than ever believe that economics needs
fresh thinking that refuses to take the “givens” of capitalist
theory for granted, yet affirms what works well in free market
economies while addressing what does not. Luigino Bruni is an
Italian historian of economics who shows the social and cultural
context of all economic activity, and throws on economics a lens
shaped by Catholic social thought. The result is an intriguing work
of rethinking—the kind of work that is urgently needed if we are
to address the social, environmental, and economic challenges facing the world.
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Bruni begins by asserting that there is a great illusion behind
much of global economy: an illusion that “the market . . . could
offer a painless and peaceful society” (xxi) by means of reducing
human interaction to the transactions that take place in anonymous
markets. It is taken for granted that the road to human “happiness”
lies in organizing life around markets. Yet that premise misses (and
ultimately undermines) the central importance of human relationships and leads to “the bleak and lonely drift of modern market
societies” (xxi). Bruni wants to affirm relatively free markets, but
do it by placing them in the larger context of, and operate them for
the benefit of, the inherently relational character of human life, including acknowledging the risks—the “wounds”—that come with
those relationships. He traces the development of social thought
from the Hebraic view that relationships do involve risk, but joy
and depth in life cannot be found without this struggle, through
Plato and Aristotle to the gradual emergence of a Modernism in
which the basis for common life came to be seen as fear rather
than love. According to Bruni, Adam Smith saw the market as a
mechanism to free individuals from needing relational networks
to help support them—the gratuitous granting of aid that family
and friendships provide could be dispensed with for much of life
(16). This dispensing with relationships gives an illusion of individual freedom, but at the price of diminishing personal meaning
and eroding family and community life.
Most importantly for Americans, Bruni’s argument ignores
(and transcends) more American ways of framing these issues, and
lays bare the “traps” in both free market (largely Republican) and
social equity (largely Democratic) approaches. On the one hand,
he makes clear why an untrammeled free market ends up undermining family life and “family values,” and on the other hand he

102

cites research that shows how “Aid without neighborliness, even
with the best of intentions, can strengthen the traps of dependency and welfarism” (23). In other words, both ends of the political policy debates in the United States have been framed within
the Modern construct of anonymous transactions, and both have
led to the thinning of the relational networks that support the full
flourishing of human life.
Bruni suggests that economics needs to be re-thought by taking into account the basis for human flourishing that is summed
up in the word “gratuitousness.” He argues that this is the literal
basis of life—every child is given life gratuitously, and nothing “is
of greater value than an act of gratuitousness (given or received),
and nothing causes greater spiritual pain than gratuitousness betrayed” (45). He goes on to state that the thesis of the book is “to
reclaim the value, including the economic value, of a more fully
dimensioned relationality, open to the contract but also to the encounter with the other inspired by gift” (45). Bruni argues that despite all attempts to remove “gratuitousness” from market life, it is
impossible and would destroy it, because it would destroy the trust
that is the relational glue that keeps markets working. He then
examines the various forms of love, and argues that there are parallels in economics for each form, beginning with eros as the driving
force of the contract, in which each “tries to fulfill itself through
the other” (47), and the center of which is the “I.” The result is an
“economic narcissism” stripped of real encounter.
The eros of the market needs philia in the companies that engage in the market—philia in which gratuitous relations of trust
can be built. Without it, staff cannot move beyond the bare stipulations of contract, and so cannot succeed in “going above and beyond” to real success—even defined as monetary success. Along
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with this is the role of agape as defined by St. Paul, which includes
being with and simply receiving (listening, accepting) the other as
beloved other. Only when all three aspects of love are engaged is
a fully human life possible. Economically, Bruni sees this more in
cooperatives or associations structured to involve equality and participation—but for philia to be effective it must be “a relationship
of choice” (56). That would rule out the coercive collectives of communism. He sees contract economics as driven primarily by a narcissistic eros on the one hand, and civil society as left to the work
of philanthropy, and philia, on the other. But these are inadequate,
and both need the dimension offered by agape—the purely gratuitous love that offers itself freely for others. Agape can rehumanize
the market, and when philia leads too far into “communitarianism”
that swallows the individual, it is the prophetic voice of agape that
can pull it back toward more human relations (59).
But how to build these ideas into economics? Here Bruni
reaches for the Catholic doctrine of subsidiarity—the principle
that human activity should take place at the “lowest” level possible,
and “higher” levels of government and organization should get
involved only to do what lower levels (family and neighborhood
and town) cannot. On these lines, contractual economics should
be nested in a new framing of subsidiarity: “let not the contract do
what friendship can do; let now friendship do what love can do.
The contract remains potentially a positive and civilizing relationship, but it must always be seen as subsidiary to philia and agape,
and not as a form of relationship that can be substituted for the
other two at a lower price” (60). Bruni cites microcredit as providing successful examples of this. He also points out that market
economics “orders subsidiarity exactly the opposite: let not love
do what the market can do” (60). This latter practice has deeply
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undercut the role and power of love and confined it to private life,
where it is eroded further by the stress economic life puts on the
family.
At this point (chapter 5), Bruni draws on the work of Antonio
Genovesi, whose work on “civil economy” took place roughly the
same time as Adam Smith’s. Genovesi was interested in what in
Scottish tradition was known as the natural virtue of friendliness,
and insisted that “Man is by nature a social animal.” (65) Accordingly, he viewed markets as “relationships of mutual assistance,
thus neither impersonal nor anonymous” (66), and as founded on
public trust, which is “the true precondition of economic development” and means that “confidence is the soul of commerce.” Bruni
goes on to cite research that shows that relationality is integral to
human flourishing, and recognition of this reality is an essential
ingredient to creation of a “new ‘economics of well-being’ ” (72).
He believes that neoclassical economic theory fails to take this
into account. There is no room for “relational goods” because these
emerge from non-instrumental motivations, while neoclassical
theory “treats goods as means, never as ends in themselves” (84).
The methodology “sees only individuals who choose” and ends up
with “methodological narcissism” (84). This ends up crowding out
real relationships. Bruni gives an example of what has happened
in music: until relatively recently, music could only be heard in a
community context, but technology and marketization have made
it possible to hear music completely alone. Because recorded music
is greatly cheaper monetarily than participation in music as a social event, it has eroded the latter. This kind of erosion is taking
place in every aspect of life, so that “we only need look closely at
our existence to see just how much authentic and meaningful relationships are being impoverished” (97).
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In his final chapter Bruni references the Catholic doctrine of
charisms—of gifts of grace—as providing a different lens with
which to view economics, “of seeing things others do not” (99).
What those with a charism can see is the gift and blessing that lies
in the challenge or threat posed by interaction with others. In economics he points to “the many men and women who committed
themselves to create the trade unions, the founders of savings and
loans, rural banks, and cooperatives, which continue to turn problems into resources and opportunities” (99–100). Those who have
contributed the most to improving civil society all had charisms to
see “in the poor, the destitute, the . . . sick, and even the deformed
something great and beautiful” (102). These gifted people were all
ultimately community builders who were “in love.” They were able
to help needy people precisely because they found them “attractive,
beautiful, and loveable” and were able to convey that to those who
needed help. They see wealth in the poor, and help them to see it
too, and so are more effective.
Where does this analysis leave us? Bruni ends by arguing that
we need to reject “the major dichotomies of modernity: economy/
society, gift/contract, eros/agape” (110). We need to expand public interaction, not diminish it for private space. We must restore
“fraternity” to “liberty, equality, and fraternity,” which has been
squeezed out by modern economics. How we are to do these things
he does not say.
I think that Bruni has provided an analysis of what has gone
missing from modern life in capitalist societies that is insightful
and helpful. His argument that economics must be re-thought
to take into account the more basic necessity of healthy relationality is right—though it should have included healthy relationships with the rest of creation, and not just human relationships.
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Still, his suggestion that the ancient tradition of advancing society
through movements created by people with charisms—people like
Muhammad Yunis—is intriguing. It also dovetails with an emerging movement to upend the Modern trend to professionalize and
commodify every area of life, and to see people, especially lowincome and others with major challenges, as problems for the state
to fix or take care of. The emerging trend is to insist that every individual, however challenged, is gifted and has something to offer
others, and that human flourishing depends on cultivating human
life in just this way. Called “ABCD” or “asset-based community
development,” this movement likewise rejects the dichotomies of
Modernity, and also rejects the ways both Republicans and Democrats have framed social policy choices, because both have been
trapped in the narrow box of Modern individualism. Bruni’s work
is a contribution to this emerging movement to re-think not only
economics, but more deeply, how we understand human beings
and our need for a common life with relational density in order to
flourish.
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